Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. F.C.C., No. 01-223 (U.S. Aug. 08, 2001) by Bohorquez, Jr., Fernando & Campbell, Angela J.
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2001
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. F.C.C., No. 01-223 (U.S. Aug.
08, 2001)
Fernando Bohorquez, Jr.
Georgetown University Law Center
Angela J. Campbell
Georgetown University Law Center
Docket No. 01-223
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb/9
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/scb
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Communications Law Commons
IN THE
TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, L.P., et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FERNANDO BOHORQUEZ, JR. ANDREW JAY SCHWARTZMAN
ANGELAJ. CAMPBELL (Counsel of Record)
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC CHERYL A. LEANZA
REPRESENTATION, HAROLD J. FELD
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT
LAWCENTER 950 18THST.,SUITE220
600 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20006
Suite312 (202)232-4300
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 662-9535
Counsel for Consumer Federation of America, et al.
August 2, 2001
iQUESTIONS PRESENTED
L_the ruling below, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit set aside a regulation of the
Federal Communications Commission on both statutory and
First Amendment grounds. The FCC rule implemented a fa-
cially-constitutional 1992 Cable Act directive that the Commis-
sion adopt a national cable ownership limit in order to foster
diversity of cable programming and prevent industry concen-
tration. After a notice and comment rulemaking, the FCC
adopted a nationwide limit of 30%. The D.C. Circuit's ruling
setting aside this limit opened the door to further concentration
in the cable industry, an industry in which the three largest
actors already control about half of the market. Moreover, the
ruling has triggered a spate of litigation seeking to overturn
ownership rules in a variety of other media subject to FCC
regulation. The questions presented for review are:
1. Whether the FCC's 30% regtflation (1) was justifiable
based on the 1992 Act's objective of promoting diversity and
(2) was adequately supported by a record comprised of detailed
Congressional and agency findings?
2. Whether the First Amendment limits the FCC's ability
to set a ceiling on the number of subscribers any one cable
operator may reach in order to achieve the constitutionally-
valid congressional goals of diversity and competition?
ii
RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT
The parties in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Docket No. 94-1035, were Time
Warner Entertainment Co., L.P ("Time Warner"), as Petitioner,
and the Federal Communications Commission and the United
States ("FCC, et al.") as Respondents. Intervenors were Bell "
South Telecommunications, Inc.; Bell Atlantic Telephone Com-
panies; AT&T Corporation; and Consumer Federation of Amer-
ica, Center for Media Education, Association of independent
Video and Filmmakers, National Association of Artists, Na- _
tional Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, Office of Communi-
cation of the United Church of Christ, Inc., and National Coun-
cil of Senior Citizens (collectively "CFA, et al.').
Parties to Docket No. 95-1337, consolidated in 94-1035, were
Time Warner, Petitioners and FCC et al., Respondents. Interve- '_
nots were Cox Communications, Inc., Bell Atlantic Telephone
Co., and U.S. West, Inc.
Parties to Docket No. 99-1503, consolidated in 94-1035, were
Time Warner, Petitioners, and FCC, et al., Respondents. e'
Petitioner -Intervenor was AT&T Corp . Intervenors were CFA , _ ".
et al.
Parties to Docket No. 99-1504, consolidated in 94-1035, were
Time Warner, Petitioners, and FCC, et al., Respondents.
Intervenors were AT&T Corp. and CFA, et al. "
Parties to Docket No. 99-1522, consolidated in 94-1035, were
Petitioners Consumers Union and Respondents FCC, et aL
Intervenors were Time Warner and AT&T Corp. I iI
Parties to Docket No. 99-1541, consolidated in 94-1035, were _,
Petitioners AT&T Corp. and Respondents FCC, etaL Intervenor ., •
wasTimeWarner.
Parties to Docket No. 99-1542, consolidated in 94-1035, were
AT&T, Petitioners and FCC, et al., Respondents. Intervenor was
Time Warner. '_
Iq'
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Parties to Docket No. 00-1086, consolidated in 94-1035, were
Petitioners Consumers Union and Respondents FCC, et al.
RULE STATEMENT 29.6
Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Cen-
ter for Media Education, Association of Independent Video and
Filmmakers, National Association of Artists, National Alliance
for Media Arts and Culture, Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ, Inc., and National Council of Senior
Citizens have no parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates
that have issued shares to the public.
iv
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1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union, Center for Media Education, Association of Independ-
ent Video and Filmmakers, National Association of Artists,
National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture, Office of Com-
murfication of the United Church of Christ, Inc., and National
Council of Senior Citizens respectfully petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit is reported at 240 F.3rd 1126 (App.
1-29) .1The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Disiadct of Columbia Circuit denying the Petition for Rehearing
is unpublished (App. 30-31). Decisions of the Federal Commu-
nication Commission in MM Docket No. 92-264, Implementing
Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, the Horizontal and Vertical
Ownership Limits, are reported as follows: Second Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is reported at 8
FCC Rcd 8565 (App. 53-96); the Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing is reported at 13 FCC Red 14462 (App. 115-180); and Third
Report and Order is reported at 14 FCC Rcd 19098 (App. 254-
311).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
March 2, 2001 (App. 1-29). A timely petition for rehearing was
denied on May 4, 2001 (App. 30-31). The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
1"App." refers to the separately bound appendix.
2CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND '_
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
First Amendment, United States Constitution: "_"
Congress shall make no law respecting ... abridging the free- ,
dora of speech, or of the press .... '
Section 11(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act, as codified in 47 USC §533(f)(1-2):
§533. Ownership restrictions
¢¢ * * _r
(f)(1) In order to enhance effective competition, the Commis-
sion shall, within one year after the date of enactment of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of _',"
1992 (enacted Oct. 5, 1992), conduct a proceeding - ,..
(A) to prescribe rules and regulations establishing reason- ".
able limits on the number of cable subscribers a person is
authorized to reach through cable systems owned by such
person or in which such person has an attributable interest ....
e¢ _¢ ,* $¢ F_
(2) In prescribing rules and regulations under paragraph (1), I
the Commission shall, among other public interest objectives - . .:
(A) ensure that no cable operator or group of cable opera- _,'r
tors can unfairly impede, either because of the size of any ,.
individual operator or because of joint actions by a group of
operators of sufficient size, the flow of video programming
from video programmer to the consumer;
(B) ensure that cable operators affiliated with video pro-
grammers do not favor such programmers in determining '".
carriage on their cable systems or do not favor such program-
mers in determining carriage on their cable systems or do not i ,
unreasonably restrict the flow of video programming of such _ i(
programmers to other video distributors; _
(C) take particular account of the market structure, owner- ,. ,,
3ship patterns, and other relationships of the cable television
industry, including the nature and market power of the local
franchise, the joint ownership of cable systems and video
programmers, and the various types of non-equity controlling
interests;
(D) account for any efficiencies and other benefits that
might be gained through increased ownership or control;
(E) make such rules and regulations that reflect the dynamic
nature of the communications marketplace;
(F) not impose limitations which would bar cable operators
from serving previously unserved rural areas; and
(G) not impose limitations which would impair the devel-
opment of diverse and high quality video programming.
47 C.F.R. §76.503:
§ 76.5{)3 National subscriber limits.
(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this section, no cable operator
shall serve more than 30% of all multichanneI-video program-
ruing subscribers nationwide through multichannel video pro-
gramming distributors owned by such operator or in which
such cable operator holds an attributable interest.
Co) Cable subscribers that a cable operator does not serve
through incumbent cable franchises shall be excluded from the
cable operator's limit.
(c) For purposes of this section, "incumbent cable franchise"
means a cable franchise in existence as of October 20,1999 and
all successors in interest to these franchises.
(d) Subscribers that a cable operator serves throughincumbent
cable franchises shall include all subscribers served by those
incumbent cable franchises, regardless of when the subscribers
were added to the incumbent cable franchise system.
(e) "Multichannel video-programming subscribers" means
subscribers who receive muhichannel video-programming
from cable systems, direct broadcast satellite services, direct-to-
4home satellite services, multichannel multipoint distribution
services, local multipoint distribution services, satellite master
antenna television services (as defined in § 76.5(a)(2)), and ';_
open video systems. _-
(f) "Cable operator" means any person or entity that owns or
has an attributable interest in an incumbent cable franchise.
(g) Prior to acquiring additionalmultichannel video-program-
ming providers, any cable operator that serves 20% or more of
multichannel video-programming subscribers nationwide shall
certify to the Commission, concurrent with its applications to
the Commission for transfer of licenses at issue in the acquisi- .,
tion, that no violation of the national subscriber limits pre- '_
scribed in this section will occur as a result of such acquisition. ,,
STATEMENT
This petition seeks review of a decision of the D.C. Circuit
that opens the door to substantial consolidation and restructur-
ing in the cable industry in contradiction to the express desire
of Congress. This decision creates precedent for overturning
a significant portion of other FCC media ownership rules. : ,.
t
A. Facts Leading to the Passage of the 1992 Cable Act. _:
In 1989, Congress began a three-year investigation into the , t
cable television industry, resulting in its sweeping re-regula- _..
tion. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition ".
Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-835,106 Stat. 1460 ("1992 Cable Act").
Undergirding the 1992 Cable Act is a deep and searching
legislative history of over 12,000 pages documenting Congress'
alarm at the cable industry's consolidation. '_
"Horizontal concentration was increasing as a small num- _ i
ber of multiple system operators (MSO's) acquired large num-
bers of cable systems nationwide ..... The trend was accelerat- ,
ing, giving the MSO's increasing market power. In 1985, the
_..
10 largest MSO' s controlled cable systems service slightly less
than 42 percent of all cable subscribers; by 1989, the figure was
t l
i
H rTL,
5nearly 54 percent." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
197 (1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) ("Turner lI").
In"unusually detailed" legislative findings, Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCG 512 U.S. 622 at 646 (1994) ("Turner I"), Congress
concluded:
The cable Industry has become highly concentrated.
The potential effects of such concentration are barriers
to entry for new programmers and a reduction In the
number of media voices available to consumers.
1992 Cable Act, §2(a) (4). It determined that national policy was
to:
[P]romote the availability to the public of a diversity of
views and information through cable television and
other video distribution media.
1992 Cable Act, §2(b)(1); see also id. §2(a)(6).
Members specifically considered the implications of consol-
idation and the adequacy of antitrust laws to address it:
Federal policy has always been vigilant to restrain
concentration when it threatened diversity of voices
even though it did not rise to the level ofan anti-trust viola-
tion.
S.Rep. No. 102-92, at 32-33 (1991) (emphasis added) ("S.Rep.').
Congress studied the national market for programming ac-
quisition, finding that it was rapidly becoming vertically inte-
grated with the cable operators' distribution networks. 1992
Cable Act, §2(a)(5). Operators would"force programmer[s] to
buy their way onto cable by givIng up an equity interest In their
programming." S.Rep. at 24.
Not only did Individual operators purchase and invest in
Individual programming services, but multiple operators often
simultaneously invested in programmers. Through their In-
vestments, major operators that might have otherwise com-
peted In programming acquisition developed a web of _lliances
6with each other, minimizing their rivalries and reducing
opportunities for a competing channel to gain carriage from
any operator. Media Ownership: Diversity and Concentration,
Hearings Beforethe Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on
the Senate Commerce, Science,and Trans., S.Hrg. 101-357, at 379-
85 (1989) ("S.Hrg. 101-357").2 In one infamous example, a large
number of cable operators-aU with a stake in the Cable News
Network-denied carriage to NBC's proposed news channel, ,,,
CNBC, unless it agreed to circumscribe its coverage in a man-
ner the FCC concluded was likely "to protect CNN from compe-
tition." Id. at 301, 609-10; Competition,Rate Deregulation and the ',i
Commission's PoliciesRelating to the Provision of CableTelevision ,'
Service, Report, 5 FCC Rcd 4962, 5028-29 (1990) ..
Cable operators controlled the subscribers a new program-
ruing channel needed to succeed, and thus "ha[d] the market
, power to determine what programming services can 'make it'
on cable." S.Rep. at 33. Successfully launching a channel was
not easy. 3
Cable operators denied their competitors, such as DBS oper-
ators, access to popular programming they needed to win cus- , ,.
tomers. S.Rep. at 26. Even independently owned channels
agreed to exclusive agreements with cable operators to avoid •
angering their largest customers. SeeHearings on S. 1880,Before
2For example, TCI jointly invested in various programmers with Time, , ,_
Storer Cable Communications, Cablevision, and Comcast, and some of those
operators also jointly invested in other programmers. Id.
3For example, the President of Discovery Network explained how, in i
tarychann 1 rtg g dhish1982-83, he conceived of a new documen e, mo a e ouse, ,
and sought for 18 months to raise the necessary $20 million in capital to
launch a programming service that would not reach the minimum number
of subscribers necessary to become self-supporting for one to two years. S.
Hrg. 101-357, at 217-19. Only through a last-minute cooperative investment
by several cable operators did the channel stave off bankruptcy. Id.
i
"Eli Wr ,,
7the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Trans., S. Hrg. 101-702, at 273, 412-13 (1990);
S.Hrg. 101-357, at 345-48.
Consequently, Congress directed the Federal Communica-
l_ons Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") to adopt a pro-
phylactic national cap to prevent growth of individual cable
operators beyond "reasonable limits." 1992 Cable Act, §11(c).
Section 11(c) contains two main subsections. The first subsec-
tion directs the Commission to conduct a proceeding to pre-
scribe rules, and begins with the phrase "[fin order to enhance
effective competition." 47 U.S.C. §533(19(1). The second states
the FCC "shall, among other public interest objectives," take
into account seven factors, including factors that specifically
address the diversity of programming consumers receive. 47
U.S.C. §§ 533(f)(2)(A), (B), (C), (G).
B. Current State of the Cable Industry.
The cable industry's horizontal and vertical consolidation
has continued unabated since Congress' findings in 1992. For
example, in 1997, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") con-
eluded that the cable television programing market is highly
concentrated. Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., Telecom-
munications Inc., and Liberty Media Corp., FTC Docket No.
C-3709, Complaint, ¶30,1997 WL 65377 (Feb. 3,1997). It further
concluded that entry into the programming market is "diffi-
cult," taking "more than two years to develop [a service] to a
point where it has a substantial subscriber base and competes
with ... 'marquee' ... service[s]" Id. ¶34.
By 2000, the top ten cable operators added 30 points to the
national subscriber share they held in 1992, increasing the
figure to 84%, and reflecting a sharp increase from 1999, when
it was 75%. Seventh Annual Video Programming Competition
Report, FCC 01-01, CS Docket 00-132, ¶171 (Jan. 8, 2001). The
top three cable operators control 47% of the market. Id. at Table
8C-3. FCC cable industry data demonstrate the impact of the
30% limit in the present market. Without the rule, concentra-
tion rises to a level that Depa_-tment of Justice ("DOJ") antitrust
standards classify as highly concentrated. 4 Moreover, multiple
cable operators conSnue to jointly invest programming chan-
nels with the highest proportion of subscribers. Id. at Tables D-
6, D-7. s Non-affiliated programmers' dependence on the lar- ,,,
gest cable operators continues as well. General Accounl_ng
Office, GAO/RCED-99-158, The Changing Status of Competition
to Cable Television, at 22 (1999).
C. Proceedings Below.
1. FCC Decisions.
The FCC established a 30% horizontal ownership limit in
1993, 6App. 66, it further developed its record and analysis in
1998, App. 115-80, and 1999. App. 254-311.
The FCC concluded that Section 11 (c) was adopted because ,_
"Congress was concerned in particular with preventing large
vertically integrated cable systems from creating barriers to
entry for new video programmers, and from causing a reduc-
tion in the number of media voices available to consumers."
App. 58. It found that Congress was concerned about cable _"
_i'heDOJ'smeasuresmarketconcentrationbytheHerfindahl-Hirschman
Index("HI-I]).DOJ considersan HHI between1000 and 1800 tobemoder-
atelyconcentrated, and above 1800 to be highly concentrated. Id. at n.572. '_
According to FCC data, the cable programming marker s current HHI is 1814.
Id. at Table C-3. If AT&T completes the suspended divestiture required by
the ownership rule described infra at n. 12, the HIqI will be reduced to 1118.
data shows 9 of the top 20 channels by subscribership and 11 of the
top 20 channels by prime time ratings are vertically integrated, of those, 7 _'
• maintain joint investments from two operators.
¢'I11eCommission adopted this limit in 1993, but immediately stayed it
when the underlying statute was declared unconstitutional, as explained infra
at note 9. App. 54.
9operators' ability to exercise monopsony power in the program
acquisition market and that" [a]lthough under traditional anti-
trust analysis the cable industry is relatively unconcentrated,
the 1992 Cable Act requires the Commission to establish limits
on horizontal concentration." Id.
The FCC described the trend toward larger cable operators
and received extensive comment from members of the cable
industry describing their desire to expand. See, e.g., id. at 272-
73, 277, 281, 285. The FCC found that the "market power of
large cable operators has the potential to prevent nascent cable
networks from even launching and to cause current networks
to fail." Id. at 291.
U,l_zing detailed economic studies of the cable industry,
data submitted to the FCC by cable operators, its own reviews
of the industry, and antitrust analysis, see, e.g, id. at 291-297, it
concluded that new programming services need access to 40%
of the nation's TV homes to attain viability. 7 Id. at 161-67, 278-
300. 8 The Commission considered the impact of limits at 20,
30, and 40 %, considering the number of competitors each limit
would likely produce. App. 62-65,320-22,161-62; 258. 284, 288-
293. Reviewing the range of limits, it concluded a 30% limit
would make it more difficult for them to "act in concert" in pro-
gram purchasing because "reaching consensus, monitoring
compliance, and punishing cheaters" would be more difficult.
Id. at 138-40. It looked at the consequences of duopolies of
equal or unequal size, and of more than two competitors. Id.
7TheFCCconducts its analysisonhomes with televisions,called"televi-
sion households." Id. at 322-31.
_l'he FCC based this estimate on a detailed review indicalSng that a new
programmer needs to reach about 15millionsubscribers,oran estimated20%
of the market, to ensure viability,App. 282-83,and that the programmer has
a 50%chance of obtaining subscribers. Id. at 287;seealsoid.at 7-8.
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Ultimately, the Commission reasoned that a 30% limit
would balance between its costs and benefits, App. 125-126,
and would best ensure the availability of the market to new
programming services because a 30% limit would "ensur [el ,..
at least 4 [operators] in the marketplace" and "will prevent two
large operators from obtaining control over [more than] 60%
of the market," id. at 290, and produce a "greater variety of
media voices ... available to the public." Id.
The FCC also observed that, even under existing ownership
limits, "credible evidence" indicated the largest operators could ,(
induce programmers not to sell their programming to competi- ,.
tors. Id. at 295; see also id. at 207-09. The FCC rejected claims ,.
that the cap should be based on a concern for unilateral action
alone, however, citing the statutory concern with joint action.
Id. at 284.
2. D.C. Circuit Decisions. ",
Last year, in the face of a First Amendment challenge, a :
panel of the D.C. Circuit declared that §11(c) of the 1992 Act is
facially constitutional. 9 Time Warner Entm't Co. v. United States, :;
211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. den., 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2000) i'
("T/me Warner I"9. The court determined that Congress re-
viewed evidence showing that the increasing consolidation of
the cable industry limited the likely success of new, independ-
_More than eight years elapsed before the court considered the validity
of the FCC's rules. Time Warner and other cable operators challenged the
constitutionality of §11(c) on its face immediately in 1993 and a lower court
invalidated the hor/zontal ownership limit that year. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. i!
v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993). Time Warner subsequently filed _
a petition for review of the FCC's rules, which the D.C. Circuit later consoli-
dated with the appeal of the statutory challenges. Time Warner v. FCC, 93 F.3d
975, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In 1999, because the FCC continued to revise its
rules, the court re-severed the two cases, considering the constitutionality of
the statute separately from the rules. Id. at 1315-16.
m _ --d'L
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ent programmers. It found that "Congress reasonably con-
cluded that this concentration threatened the diversity of
information available to the public and could form a barrier to
the entry of new cable programmers. That is hardly an unrea-
sonable inference." Id. at 1320.
On March 2, 2001, another panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated
the FCC's rules, in an opinion authored by Judge Williams.
App. 1-29. Despite the extremely detailed legislative and agen-
cy findings, the court found that the FCC had not met its bur-
den under the First Amendment and lacked statutory authority
for some of its actions. Id. at 2.
The court did not contest the FCC's conclusion that a new
programmer needs an "open field" of 40%, id. at 9, but con-
cluded that the FCC's analysis supported a rule limiting cable
operators to 60%, rather than 30%, of subscribers. Id.
Although the court concluded that statutory authority to
protect programmers from the action of one operator "flows
plainly" to the FCC because "if the [government's interest] in
diversity is to mean anything.., the government must be able
to ensure that a programmer have atleast two conduits through
which it can reach the number of viewers needed for viability,"
id. at 8, the court did not extend its deference to Congress'
language addressing multiple operators. The court concluded
that the FCC must make a separate, and more significant,
showing to justify a limit that protects potential programmers
from joint cable operator action. Id.
Specifically, the court believed that a lower, 30 % cap could
be justified only if: (1) there was a non-conjectural risk that two
or more operators would "collude" to deny carriage to a pro-
grammer, or (2) the FCC had the authority under the 1992 Act
to promote diversity by regulating the unilateral acts of cable
operators. App. 9.
The court's analysis of the first issue hinged on one of the
12
many terms used by the FCC to consider the cap-the term
"collusion." The court concluded that either Congress or the
FCC must produce "substantial evidence" of "collusion" to
meet the Turner I and Turner II standard. Id. at 9. The court
found fault with Congress for failing to identify "collusion"
specifically. Id. It found that the language Congress did use ".
was inadequate, concluding that the statutory language "au-
thorizing regulations to protect against 'joint actions by a group
of operators of sufficient size,'" was not a finding of "probable"
collusion but instead evidenced only a "possibility" of collusion. _
Id. at 9 (quoting §533(f)(2)(A) (court's emphasis)).
The court then determined that the FCC also had not pro-
duced a sufficient record through its own proceedings. App.
10-11. The court dismissed as "economic commonplace" the
Commission's analysis concluding that a limit producing three _
large competitors instead of two large competitors was prefera-
ble because collusion is less likely when there are more firms.
Id. at 10.
With respect to the second issue, the court sharply limited ,
the Commission's ability to adopt regulations based on diver-
sity, as opposed to competitive concerns. The court concluded
that the first of seven guideposts in Section (0(2) was the
"relevant provision." App. 14-15. This section directed the
FCC to ensure that no cable operator or group of operators ,._
could "unfairly impede ... the flow of video programming to
the consumer." 47 U.S.C. §533(f)(2)(A). The court acknowl-
i
edged the term "unfair" was "extremely vague." Id. at 15. The _,
court also acknowledged that Section 11(c) contains the "dual- ,-
ity" of competition and diversity which run throughout the
1992 Cable Act. Id. at 15-16. Nonetheless, the court determined
the introductory phrase in §533 (f) (1)("to enhance effective com-
petition") was plain enough for it to conclude that Congress'
"primary" goal was to promote "fair"-meaning "eco- ,,_
I
) i"
d'
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nomic"-competition. Id. at 15.
The court therefore rejected the Commission's interpreta-
tion of the statute based on the Act's codified legislative find-
ings. App. 16-17. It didnot address subsection (f)(2)'sremain-
hag diversity directives. Id. As a result, the court held that the
FCC could not achieve its goal of preserving a multiplicity of
programming sources by selecting an ownership limit lower
than that necessary to achieve fair competition alone. Id. at 14.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE INSTANT CASE WARRANTS REVIEW BECAUSE
ITS FLAWED CONSTITtJTIONAL DOcIRINE WOULD
THREATEN NEARLY EVERY FCC MEDIA OWNER-
SHIP REGULATION.
Any dedsioninvalidating, on constitutional grounds, a fed-
eral agency's implementation of a concededly valid statutory
directive to impose industry-wide ownership limits is surely
a matter of importance. I°
Certiorari is especially appropriate here, not just because
of the decision's intrinsic jurisprudential importance, but also
because this case involves the mechanisms of citizenship. As
this Court has emphasized, "assuring that the public has access
to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to
the First Amendment." Turner/, 512 U.S. at 663.
The precedential force of the D.C. Circuit's opinion pro-
mises to bring immediate and sweeping changes to ownership
concentration in all electronic media industries.
aCBecause the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction 0fmany telecommu-
nications cases, see 47 U.S.C. §402(a), and is the h'aditional venue for most
other broadcast and cable cases, it is highly unlikely that other circuits will
consider the issues presented here. Thus, there is no reason for this Court to
await the development of inter-circuit conflicts before granting certiorari.
/14
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Thisisnota matterofspeculation:thecourt'sdecisionhas
alreadybeen extendedtojustifyinterimrehefsuspendingFCC
ruleslimitingnationaland localbroadcaststationownership,
and ithas been employed tochallengetheCommission'sban
on TV/cablecross-ownershiprules.The immediateeffectof "
thiscase was so dramatic that itbecame the subjectof a page
one New York Times story. Evaluating the impact of this case i
and the Viacom stay discussed below, the Times said that " [i]n
a marked departure from decades of Supreme Court opinions e
on the subject, the appeals court and the FCC have become
significantly ... more skeptical of the role of government in
promoting diversity in mass media." "Media Companies Suc-
ceed in Easing Ownership Limits," New York Times, p. 1, April
16, 2001. ",
AT&T/Time Warner Divestiture - Just two weeks after the
panel issued its decision, without awaiting issuance of the
Circuit's mandate, the FCC, sua sponte, cited this case in reliev- ,'
ing Respondent AT&T Corp. (the largest cable operator) of a _.
May 19, 2001 deadline to divest its 22.5% partnership interest
in the second largest cable operator, Respondent Time Warner
Entertainment. MediaOne Group, Inc., 16 FCC Rcd 5835 (2000).
Thus, as a direct consequence of this case, AT&T now has
ownership interests in cable systems reaching almost 40% of the ' ,',
nation's TV homes, n
Proposed Sale of AT&T Cable - In the weeks preceeding
submission of this petition, Comcast, (the third largest oper- r,
ator) and AOL/Time Warner (the second largest) have publicly _'
disclosed that each has been negotiating a possible takeover ".
of AT&T. Industry executives, financial analysts, and press
nLetterh'omDouglasG.Garrett,Docket99-251(/iledJune29,2001).When r,_
Congress mandated the cable ownership cap in 1992, the largest operator had
i ,
a 25% share of that market. H.R. Rep. No. 102-628, at 42 (1992).
i
t,(
l i jr
15
commentators pointed to the decision below when predicting
that such combinations (which might result in a single operator
serving well over half the nation's cable subscribers) could re-
ceive FCC approval. 12
National Broadcast Ownership - The impact of the decision
has not been limited to cable operators. On April 6, 2001, the
D.C. Ciroait granted a stay excusing Viacom, Inc. from com-
plying with an FCC directive to divest one or more television
stations to come into compliance with the FCC's 35 % national
ownership 1h-nit on broadcast properties. Viacom, Inc. v. FCC,
No. 01-1136 (D.C. Cir., April 6, 2001). 13 Because of the Viacom
stay, the FCC has indefinitely deferred enforcement of a similar
requirement as applied to News Corp., the parent of the Fox
network. 14The FCC Chairman has publicly stated his doubt as
_2See,e.g., "Regulatory Forecast Looks Fair for Possible Comcast Corp./
AT&T Broadband Merger," Multichannel News, p. 5, July 16, 2001; "Experts
Say Regulators Would Likely Approve Comcast, AT&T Merger," The Philadel-
phia Inquirer, July 14, 2001 (referring to the court's decision as giving Comcast
"an especially good time to bid because the old ownership rules were not in
force...."); "Deal Should Face Little Opposition from Regulators," The Wail
Street Journal, p. B1, July 10, 2001 ("But ownership caps were overturned by
a federal appeals court earlier this year, and the FCC has yet to replace them.
That means cable companies are enjoying a rare regulatory free-for-all.").
l_I1_e Appellants' March 19, 2001 Emergency Motion for lnterim Relief arg-
ued that Time Warner v. FCC was controlling precedent. See also CBS Cor-
poration, FCC No. 01-94 (March 16, 2001) (denying application for stay) ("I
believe the facts before the Commission and the recent TWE decision warrant
the interim relief sought by Viacom.")[Furchgott-Roth, dissenting). The ease
was brought under 42 U.S.C. §402(a), which, as is noted in note 10, supra, con-
fers exclusive jurisdiction on the D.C. Circuit.
14See UTVofSan Francisco Inc., FCC No. 01-201 (rel. July 25, 2001) ("In
light of [the Viacom stay], we believe it is appropriate to delay the effective-
ness of our condition requiring [Fox] to come into compliance... Accordingly,
[Fox] will be afforded a period of 12 months following entry of a final deci-
16
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to whether the national broadcast ownership cap will with-
stand review under the precedent of this case. 15
Local Broadcast Ownership - The decision was also the
basis for a successfulmotion for stay of the required divestiture
of four TV stations under the Commission's local television
duopoly rules. Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC, No. 01-1079
(D.C Cir. June 20, 2001). It has been reported that the FCC "is ,
reviewing whether to extend the delay to ... other [broadcast
ownership] groups" and that the several companies under simi- '"
lar divestiture orders "are likely to get some relief ... pending
the outcome of a court challenge ...." Broadcasting and Cable,
July 2, 2001, p. 4.
Local Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership - Time Warner r_
has also sought to extend the precedent of this case to the FCC's
!
rule prohibiting common ownership of TV stations and cable
systems in the same market. Its June 15, 2001 brief to the D.C.
,.
Circuit in Docket No. 00-1222 cites this case as the principal
authority on which its challenge is based. *"
This decision must be reviewed now because the ownership
consolidation it invites carmot be urLraveled. After transactions
are consummated, "it becomes difficult, and sometimes virtu-
ally impossible, to'unscramble the the eggs.'" Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorco, .A., 871 F.2d 252, 261 (2d Cir.), amended,
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989) (quoting
sion..,upholding the nationalbroadcastownership cap. "). Judicialreview
of this decision would, under 42 U.S.C.§402(a),occurin the D.C.Circuit.
iSlna interviewtranscriptpostedontheChairman'spersonalwebpage, i".
hespeculatedhat"Manypeoplesee[thestay]asagravesignforthelifeof
therule....[N]otsomanyweeksagothecourtstruckdown horizontalru es
inthecablecontext-potentiaUysignalingsortofsimilarskepticismabouthis
rule..,[Thecourt]hasmadealreadysomejudgmentthathereisalikelihood I
to prevail on the merits of the petition." ConversationWith SamDonaldson,
wwwd_c.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/ spmkp102.pdf(accessedJuly26,2001).
r
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Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250
(2d Cir. 1973)). The problem is worse when consolidation
removes "an effective competitor in markets of vital interest to
the nation's economy...." Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d
10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981)).
II. THECOURTVIOLATEDBASICPRINCIPLESOF STAT-
UTORY CONSTRUCTION AND DID NOT APPROPRI-
ATELY DEFER TO THE AGENCY'S REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACT.
Only the D.C. Circuit's misinterpretation of the1992 Cable
Act allowed it to reach the First Amendment issues in this case.
The panel sharply departed from the "elementary rule ... that
every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality."INS v. Enrico St. Cyr.,
121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 n. 12 (2001) (quoting Hooper v. California,
155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
("DeBartolo')(applied to agency's construction of a statute).
In previously upholding the facial constitutionality of
§11 (c), the Time Warner I court held that the concentrated cable
industry posed a real, non-conjectural harm to diversity. 211
F.3d at 1320. Notwithstanding this holding, the court removed
"diversity" from the First Amendment calculus when it de-
clared the rules unconstitutional.
After finding that the FCC lacked the authority to limit
ownership based on diversity, the courtwas free to narrow the
First Amendment question as to whether Congress or the FCC
had provided substantial evidence that two or more operators
would "collude" to deny carriage to a programmer. App. 7.
As a result, as detailed in Part I supra, the very dangers Con-
gress foresaw and sought to prevent are now rapidly coming
to pass.
18 °
A. The Court Improperly Construed the Statute to Ex-
clude Diversity.
The Panel concluded that the FCC lacked statutory author-
ity to limit the size of cable operators based on diversity con- '_
cerns, and, in stark conflict with the statutory language, must
instead act only on the court's notions of antitrust law. The
opinion below disregarded the plain language of 11(c), failed '
to consider the statutory context, and brushed aside the mu- _
tually reinforcing nature of diversity and competition. ._
The panel erred in failing to read Section 11(c) within the
statutory context of the 1992 Cable Act and the 1934 Communi-
cations Act. Basic canons of statutory construction require
interpretation of this language and the purpose in the context "
of the statute as a whole. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco,
529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000). In particular, where Congress
chooses to amend the Communications Act rather than enact ' '
a freestanding provision, the court must read the separate ,.
statutory provisions in light of the broad purposes and powers
of the Communications Act as a whole. AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999).
Section 533 (f)(2) directs that in setting ownership limits, the
FCC "shall"consider "other public interest objectives." This
,, r r
Courthas consistently construed the term public interest" as
embodying diversity. National Broadcasting Co.v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). As this Court has explained, "the 'pub- t,
lie interest' standard necessarily invites reference to First ,..
II
Amendment principles, and, in particular, to the First Amend- .-
ment goal of achieving "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." FCC v.
NCCB, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (citations omitted)) 6
l_ne concern with diversity does not conflict with the statute's stated
purpose of"enhanc[ing] effectivecompetition." §533(f)(1).Tothe conlwary, } i;
i
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Four other public interest factors listed in §533(f)(2) explic-
itly refer to Congress' objective of promoting diversity. As the
Commission emphasized, "[Sections 533(f)(2)(A), (B), (C) and
(G)] require the Commission to ensure that operators, unilater-
ally or in coordination, do not unreasonably restrict the flow
of video programming to consumers and do not hinder the de-
velopment of new programing from diverse voices." App. 280.
In contrast, relying on the term "unfair" in §533(f) (2)(A), the
panel concluded that the statute addressed only two situations -
a single cable operator's actions, or, the "collusive" behavior of
several operators. App. 6. The panel reached this result by
relying on the introductory phrase of (f)(1), concluding "that
these regulations axe to be promulgated '[i]n order to enhance
effective competition.'" App. at 16 (emphasis original).17 The
panel therefore dismissed the FCC's reliance on'the congressio-
nal finding that the "'cable industry has become highly concen-
"our past decisions have recognized, moreover, that the First Amendment
and antitrust values underlying the Commission's diversification policy may
properly be considered by the Commission in determining where the public
interest lies." NCCB, 436 U.S. at 795(emphasis added). See also Turner II, 520
U.S. at 198.
17inattempting to read the statute as a limitation on the FCC's discretion,
the court compared the purposes of §533(f) to two other sections of the 1992
Act which also contain specific directives for implementation. App. 16, n.8.
Actually, all three sections explicitly expand the FCC's powers. However,
were it true that the purposes set out in those two sections did limit the FCC's
discretion, that is indubitably not the case for §533(f); unlike the other provi-
sions, this one gives the FCC a range of objectives, from which it must pick
and choose. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 568, 596 (1981)
("[D]iversity is not the only policy the Commission must consider....[Its]
implementation ... when based on a rational weighing of policies _. is not to
be set aside."); Northeast Utilities Service Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 952-53 (1st
Cir. 1993)(agency discretion is at its "zenith" when balancing among objec-
tives).
q2O
trated,'" 1992 Cable Act §2(a)(4), and the general policy of
promoting diversity, §2(b)(1). App. 16. The Panel concluded
that "reference to a Congressional finding cannot overcome ,_,
clear language and purpose of the actual provision." Id.
While a finding may not override statutory language, it i
does inform interpretation of the word Congress did use, ,
"unfairly," particularly when, as the Panel admits, that word
is "extremely vague." Id. at 15. Given the FCC's broad powers
under the Communications Act to promote diversity and com-
petition, NCCB, 436 U.S. at 798-802, the court should not have
interpreted either "unfairly" or "enhance effective competition"
as constricting the FCC's authority to regulate based on diver- ,_
sity concerns. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass" n, Inc., 121
S. Ct. 903, 910 (2001) (Congress "does not ... hide elephants in i
l' ,
mouseholes ), see also United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., ,
351 U.S. t92, 203 (1956); Oceanair of Fla,, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't. of _'
Transp., 876 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11_ Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts should
not infer that Congress intended to restrict an agency's broad
powers ... unless Congress has explicitly done so.").
The court below improperly used the surrounding words
in the statute to substitute its own strict re-reading of a single _,_
statutory word for the agency's reasonable construction and in ,:
violation of the plain language. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities f_r a Greater Ore, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995)("Sweet i lI
HorneD.;FTC v. Mandel Bros , Inc , 359 U S. 385, 389-390 (1959)
This renders "mere surplusage," Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698,
the phrase "among other public interest objectives" and the re- •
maining factors Congress enumerated for the FCC to consider.
Such judicial revisionism is "an undertaking more consonant
with the task of a congressional committee than with judicial _,_
construction." MandeI Bros., 359 U.S. at 390. Indeed, by redraft-
ing the statute in this fashion, the panel opened the door to the
very consolidation §11(c) sought to prevent, i _,_"
[
., _r _
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B. The Panel Failed to Defer to the Agency And Thus
Unnecessarily Created a Constitutional Conflict.
The Panel's refusal to defer did more than misapply the
relevant standard. It created an unnecessary Constitutional
conflict, striking down the regulations on First Amendment
grounds. In such a case, a construction that defers to the agen-
cy is particularly warranted. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575. TM
This Court has consistently recognized that "[w]hen Con-
gress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation." United States v. Mead Corp., 121
S.Ct. 2164, 2170 (2001) (quoting Chevron., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844
(1984)). "[A] court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
... an agency." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. In this case, Congress
explicitly delegated to the FCC the task of setting the national
limit, and the court should have deferred to the FCC's reason-
able construction of section 533(f).
1. The FCC interpreted section 533(0 as directing it to
consider diversity when setting the ownership limits. App.
267-269, 280. It explicitly rejected the view that Congress
intended the FCC to focus on antitrust principles to the exclu-
sion of its traditional public interest review, concluding that to
do so would nullify four of the seven factors Congress Included
in §533(t)(2). App. 280; Time WarnerI, 211 F.3d at 1316.
Although the court expressly acknowledged that the lan-
18"Itis well understood that when there are two reasonable constl-uc_ons
for a statute, yet one raises a constitutional question, the Court should prefer
the interpretation which avoids the constitutional issue." Legal Services Corp.
v. VeIazquez, 121 S.Ct. 1043,1050 (2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.
858, 864 (1989)); See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (noting that
departure from this principle is "plain error") (1988).
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guage it found controlling was "extremely vague,"App. 15, it
ignored the FCC's analysis. ,_
The FCC's decision was far more reasonable than the
court's. The Commission read the law as directing use of a
traditional public interest analysis to remediate levels of con-
centration which might be considered "safe" under traditional
antitrust analysis. App. 267-69 (relying on H.Rep at 42). This "
accords with the interpretation given to §11(c), and the 1992 Act
generally, by the courts. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 198-90; Time
Warner I, 211 F.3d at 1319-20. By contrast, Congress never
used the word "collusion," ,_
2. The legislative history shows that the drafters of the
legislation did not intend to sever §11 (c)from the FCC's general
pubic interest authority. The Senate Report observed that ,(
"[a]lthough the FCC has the authority to impose horizontal
limitations on the cable industry (both national and regional), "
it has not done so." S.Rep. at 34. As a result, "to address the
issue of national concentration in the cable industry and en-
hance effective competition, the legislation directs the FCC to
place reasonable limits on the size of MSOs." Id. The drafters _,
intended that the legislation give "the FCC flexibility to deter- _:
mine what limits are reasonable and in the public interest." Id.
(emphasis added). This understandingis echoed in the section- _,
by-section analysis. Id. at 80.
When considering the need for a horizontal limit, the Senate _
Report identified two concerns: that"concentration of the me- "
dia in the hands of a few" would allow "media gatekeepers"
uto control information and foreclose avenues for unorthodox
or unpopular speech"; and that horizontal concentration "can
be the basis of anticompetitive acts." S.Rep. at 32-33. It further t ,
noted that "Federal policy has always been vigilant to restrain
concentration when it threatened diversity of voices even :
t,(
though it did not rise to the level of an anti-trust violation." Id.
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at 32-33.
In considering an analogous provision, the House Report
also rejected "traditional antitrust analysis," staling that "di-
versity ofinformationsourcescanonlybeassuredby imposing
limits ... substantially below those that traditional antitrust
analysis would support." H.R. Rep. at 42. The analysis con-
cludes that "competition is essential both for ensuring diversity
...andforprotectingconsumers." Accordingly, "steps must be
taken to encourage robust competition in the video program-
ming marketplace." Ill. at 44.
Thus, Congress clearly intended to promote diversity
through the horizontal ownership limit. The drafters viewed
the purpose of "enhancing effective competition" as the mech-
anism by which diversity is preserved and enhanced. See also
Time Warner L 211 F.3d at 1319-20. The court below, by substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the agency's, nullified this Con-
gressional intent. By doing so, the panel undermined funda-
mental statutory policy designed to prevent "anticompetitive
acts" and the creation of powerful "media gatekeepers." S.Rep.
at 32-33.
III. THE PANEL FAILED TO AFFORD SUBSTANTIAL
DEFERENCE TO THE PREDICTIVE JUDGMENT OF
CONGRESS AND THE FCC.
The panel's failure to afford substantial deference to the
predictive judgment of Congress and the FCC squarely conflicts
with this Court's decisions in NCCB, Turner I and II, and other
precedents. In so doing, the panel improperly dismissed the
FCC's reliance on its decades of experience regulating the cable
industry, as well as commonly accepted economic principles
concerning concentrated markets and anti-competitive behav-
ior. The result is an intermediate in theory, but strict in fact,
O'Brien standard of review that more closely resembles the
strict scrutiny reserved for content-based regulations. The
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panel's new standard strips Congress and the FCC of the flex- ,,,
ibility necessary to adequately respond to the complicated
issues presented by telecommunications regulation, preventing
it from properly balancing the free speech interests at stake.
A. The Panel's Rejection of the Predictive Judgments of
Congress and the FCC Sharply Departs From This Court's _
First Amendment Jurisprudence.
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, "courts
must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments
of Congress." TurnerI, 520 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted). Sire- ,_
ilarly, when "evaluating the First Amendment claims of re-
spondents [this Court] must afford great weight to the deci-
sions of Congress and the experience of the Commission." Co-
lumbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat: Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973); Turner If, 520 U.S. at 196.533(0. *
1. In 1992, Congress determined that without preemptive
action, the cable industry would reach a level of concentration
inimical to the public interest. 1992 Cable Act, §2(a)(4); S.Rep.
at 32-34. Congress made the underlying predictive judgment ,,
that a prophylactic cap on the number of subscribers a single
cable operator could reach was necessary to preserve a diver-
sity of outlets in the market, as well as safeguard against anti- ; ii
competitive effects associated with highly concentrated markets
with barriers to entry such as cable. 1992 Cable Act, §11(c); Time _'_
Warner I, 211 F.3d at 1320. Accordingly, Congress directed the
FCC to set a reasonable limit to further these important inter-
ests.
The panel effectively contravenes Congress' fundamental
predictive judgment concerning concentration and the cable
industry. As demonstrated above, it frustrated Congressional
directives by sharply limiting the FCC's authority under the i _,:
statute to set a limit based on diversity concerns. As explained
below, the panel failed to defer to the FCC's expertise, an _'
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expertise Congress intended the FCC to exercise in setting a
pro-diversity, pro-competitive floor in the cable market. This
is flatly inconsistent with this Court's precedents. TurnerlI,520
U.S. at 224 ("Judgments about how competing economic inter-
ests are to be reconciled in the complex and fast-changing field
of television are for Congress to make.")
2. When factual determinations of the FCC are "primarily
of a judgmental or predictive nature.., complete factual support
in the record for the Commission's judgment or prediction is
not possible or required; a forecast of the direction in which
future public interest ties necessarily involves deductions based
on the expert knowledge of the agency." NCCB, 436 U.S. at 813-
14 (citations and internal quotes omitted); FCC v. WNCN Listen-
ers Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594-96 (1981); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665
(citing NCCB, 436 U.S. at 814); cf. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v.
Nat'lRes. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87,103 (1983) (_'court must gener -
ally be at its most deferential" when reviewing predictions
within agency's expertise).
The panel held that the FCC had not provided sufficient
evidence demonstrating a risk of collusion. App. at 10. This is
in clear conflict with NCCB; in upholding the FCC's newspa-
per-broadcast cross-ownership rule under a First Amendment
challenge, this Court held that the "the [FCC] was entitled to rely
on its judgment, based on experience, that it is unrealistic to expect
true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper
combination." NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97 (citations and internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added). This Court rejected
claims that the FCC needed to "conclusively establish" that the
rule would lead to viewpoint diversity. Id. Rather, it empha-
sized deference to the FCC's predictive judgment because "[d]i-
versity and its effects are ... elusive concepts ... evidence of
specific abuses by common owners is difficult to compile [and]
the possible benefits of competition do not lend themselves to
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detailed forecast. "Id. ,,.
Given the Congressional directive to adopt an ownership
cap, the FCC is entitled to even greater deference here than in
NCCB, where the agency was invoking generic statutory pow- ':
,(
ers. The FCC used its extensive expertise with the cable indus-
try to predict that a high level of concentration would raise too r
great a threat to diversity and too high a risk of anti-competi- _"
tire behavior. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97; Marsh Media v. FCC,
798 F.2d 772, 776 (5_ Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to broadcast TV-cable
cross ownership rule based on predictive judgment); see City
of Erie, et aI. v. Pap"s A.M., TDBA "Kandyland," 529 U.S. 277, 297
(2000)(referring to FCC's "special firsthand knowledge" of Li'
cable industry and citing NCCB, 436 U.S. at 775). Implement-
inglegislation designed to prevent anti-competitive practices is '"
precisely the situation that calls for substantial deference. :
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J. concurring) (emphasizing
deference to judgments concerning "forestalling the abuse of
monopoly power..."). As in NCCB, demanding evidence of
collusion apriori is "difficult to compile" and would defeat the
prophylactic purpose of § 11(c).
In the decision under review, the FCC applied its familiarity
with video markets to the rulemaking record. App. 281-88.
This produced several possible percentages, id. 285-290, which
it narrowed to three-20%, 30%, or 40 N-after weighing Con-
gress" concerns with preserving efficiencies of scale for cable
operators and the threats concentration posed to competition
and diversity. Id. The FCC ultimately concluded that a 30%
limit would best ensure the availability of new programming _'
services and preserve a reasonable level of diversity. See dis-
cussion supra at 9-10; App. 289-91. The 30% limit also addres-
sed the unilateral effects a large operator may have on the
market. Id. at 138, 295.
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The courtimproperly second-guessed the FCC s predictive
judgment in balancing the competing interests involved to set
a pro-competitive, pro-diversity floor for the cable industry.
WNCN, 450 U.S. at 594-96 (affirming the FCC's predictive
judgment "assess[ing] the benefits and harms likely to flow
from Government review of entertainment programming..." );
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 674 (1972); cf.,
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224.
3. The reasonableness of the FCC's predictive judgment is
further supported by its reliance on economic principles con-
cerning the anti-competitive risks of concentrated markets.
When reviewing First Amendment challenges, this Court has
noted that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened scrutiny of legislative judgment willvary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391
(2000). The FCC relied on accepted economic principles to con-
clude that a 30% limit would substantially reduce the likelihood
of explicit or implicit coordinated activity between large cable
operators because such "activity... is more likely with few firms
than many (due to greater ease in reaching consensus, monitor-
ing compliance, and punishing cheaters), and such behavior
will have a greater impact the larger combined share of the
market these firms control."App. 295-96, 139. Such a proposi-
tion is "neither novel nor implausible." Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391
(characterizing the legislature's judgment regarding the effect
of money on the political process). This Court has deferred in
other First Amendment contexts to the predictive judgments
of lawmakers centering on commonly accepted principles. Id.
at 391-396; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,208-211 (1992). The
FCC should not be held to a higher standard.
While the panel discounts predictive judgments based on
the level of concentration in a market, App. at 11-12, structural
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market analysis is a linchpin of antitrust law. "Merger law,
'rests upon the theory that, where rivals are few, firms will be
able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or
,.
implicit understanding, in order to restrict out put and achieve
profits above competitive levels." FTC v. H. J.Heinz Co., 246 r
F.3d 708, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(citations omitted).19 For instance, _"
the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines rely on market concentration
to determine the potential anti-competitive dangers of a pro-
posed merger. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines,§ 1.5 (1992), as revised (1995).
The FCC employed these principles to set a limit to prevent
the cable market from consolidating to a level that would
present the anti-competitive harms associated with highly
concentrated markets with large barriers to entry, such as cable. _
App. 291-293. "The combination of a concentrated market and
barriers to entry is a recipe for price coordination." H. J.Heinz
Co.,246 F.3d at 724 (citations omitted). The FCC's concern with
setting a limit preempting tacit coordination is especially
supported by accepted economic principles. Id. (quoting 4
Areeda, et al., ANI_IRUSTLAW ¶901b2, at 9 (rev. ed. 1998)
("central object of merger policy [is] to obstruct the creation or
!,(
reinforcement by merger of ... oligopolistic market structures
in which tacit coordination can occur."). The FCC's selection *
of 30 %is consonant with the Merger Guidelines as well. Under
the Guidelines, even a market less concentrated than one
_gSee also United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.$. 486, 497 (1974) '_,
(emphasizing prima fade anti-competilive threats of highly concentrated ,
markets); Sullivan & Grimes, THE LAW OF AN xli Kus'r: AN ]_N'I_GRATED HAND-
IK_OK 530 (2000) ( The rule of thumb...ls that the more concentrated an
industry, the more likely is oligopolistic behavior...For example, a ten-firm I!_r
industry is more likely to require some sort of coordination...whereas the _.
three-firm industry might more easily maintain prices through parallel
behavior without express coordination.").
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allowed by the FCC's cap would be highly concentrated and
presumptively indicate a high risk of anti-competitive effects.2°
Contrary to the panel's implication, the FCC did not act in
a vacuum when it selected the 30 % limit to create a prophylaxis
to ensure diversity and enhance competition. App. 11 (rejecting
conclusion "that ... collusion is less likely when there are more
firms... [because]...by itself it lends no insight into the question
of what the appropriate horizontal limit is."). As discussed
above, the FCC applied these principles within the narrow
context of deciding between a cap ensuring at least five (20%),
four (30%), or three (40%) material operators in the market.
Further, the record evinces barriers to entry for new program-
mers, App. 291-93, a trend toward concentrationin the market,
see discussion supra at 9, and a web of inter-connected relation-
ships between operators, id. at 5-6. These factors make it partic-
ularly appropriate for the FCC to have employed economic
principles to bolster its analysis.
Finally, other panels of the D.C. Circuit have deferred to
predictive judgments forecasting anti-competitive practices in
the cable industry founded on basic economic principles. In
Time Warner L the D.C. Circuit deferred to the predictive judg-
ment of Congress that the concentrated cable market posed a
risk to diversity and competition to uphold the constitutionality
of §11(c). 211 F. 3d at 1319-1320.
B. The Court's Repudiation of the FCC's Predictive Judg-
ment Creates a StandardWhicliis Intermediate in Theory,
2°Under the Guidelines, market concentrationis measured by Hill. The
Guidelines cite a market with four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20%
and 20% as highly concentrated with an HHI of 2600. Ma'ger Guidelines § 1.5
n.17. A 30% limit is also consistent with the other standard measurement of
market concentration-the Four Firm Concentration Ratio. See Shepard, THE
ECONOMICSOF INDUSTRIALORGANIZATION 4 (1985) (market where leading
four firms have hi excess of 60% is considered highly concentrated).
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but Strict in Fact.
The cable ownership limits are content-neutral. Time Warn- _:
er I, 211 F.3d at 1317-18; App. 6. And as this Court has held, ' "
content-neutral rules "do not pose such inherent dangers to free ,"
expression, or present such potential for censorship ... as to
justify application of the most exacting level of First Amend-
mentscrutiny." TurnerI,512U.S. at661. Structuralregulations
like the ownership limits foster Congress' diversity goals in a
content-neutral manner without raising the specter of govern- '_
ment censorship. S.Rep. at 50; Review of the Commission's Regu-
lations Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 FCC Rcd 12903, _:
12915 (1999). For this reason, structural media regulations are ,
reviewed under the more lenient O'Brien standard. Id., at 12915 ,"
(citing NCCB, 436 U.S at 801; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189)).
1. In dismissing the FCC's reliance on its expertise and
accepted economic principles to set the 30% ownership limit,
the panel effectively elevated the O'Brien intermedilte standard
of review to a level more closely resembling the strict scrutiny '_
reserved for content-based rules. This new standard is driven
by an overly demanding substantial evidence requirement of :
the "harm" prong of 0 'Brien intermediate scrutiny. It strips the ' ,"
FCC of the necessary flexibility to implement Congressionally ,..
mandated, prophylactic, content-neutral structural regulations.
Precluding the FCC from employing accepted economic prind-
pies to predict anti-competitive behavior substantially hobbies
the FCC's ability to promulgate rules preventing such harms.
A plurality of this Court has cautioned against the applicat- "_
ion of First Amendment norms in the media context that would
"impose judicial formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket _
that disables government from responding to serious problems." t _
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. ,.
727, 741 (1996) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor and
Souter, J.J. concurring in judgment and concurring in part)
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(emphasis added). The court's misconstruction of O'Brien
intermediate scru_ny does precisely what Denver Area instructs
not to do. By sharply limiting the FCC's ability to act preemp-
tively, the panel's new standard "lack[s] the flexibility neces-
sary to allow government to respond to very serious practical
problems...." Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 740; cf. Bartnicki v. Hopper,
121 S Ct. 1753, 1768 (2001)("In my view, the Constitution per-
mits legislatures to respond flexibly to the challenges future
technology may pose to the individual's interest in basic per-
sonal privacy.") (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
2.. Moreover, hamstringing the flexibility of the FCC pre-
vents it from properly balancing the compe_ng free speech
interests implicated in this case. "In such circumstances, where
a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected
interests in complex ways the Court... has balanced interests." Nix-
on, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, J.J., concurring)
(emphasis added). In fact, this Court has consistently balanced
the relevant free speech interests when reviewing First Amend-
ment challenges to media regulations. See, e.g., Turner II, 520
U.S. at 192-194 (recognizing the speech interests of both viewers
and cable operators) and at 224-229 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part) (balancing "the important First Amendment interests on
both sides of the equation "); Columbia Broad. Syst., 412 U.S. at
102-103 ("Balancing the various First Amendment interests
involved in the broadcast media ....").
The court radically departed from this body of caselaw by
solely considering the free speech interests of cable operators.
The panel's First Amendment analysis focused exclusively on
the modest infringement the 30% lim/t imposed on cable opera-
tors' freedom of expression. _ In contrast, the panelignored the
21The30%limitexcludes new subscribers gained from "overbuilding,"
the construction of a second cable system in an area already served by an
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free speech interestsof the key beneficiariesof the 1992 Act-the
viewing public and independent prograrmners.
In sum, the court decision demonstrably tilts the scale in
favor of the cable operator, and indeed any entity challenging
the FCC's structural media regulations. In so doing, it blurs the
distinction between the strict scrutiny applied to content-based
restrictions of speech and the traditionally more relaxed level
of review applied to content-neutral regulations. = In this way, ",
the panel's holding is reminiscent of the long since repudiated
doctrine of Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) employed by
this Court to strike down socio-economic legislation"based on
the Court's own notions of the most appropriate means for the ,.
State to implementits considered policies." Central Hudson, 447 ..
U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). Accordingly, this Court
should review the panel's decision.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted. ,,.
Respectfully submitted, i
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incumbent operator. App. 279. Thus, the limitdoesnotprevent an operator
from speaking directly to 100%of the country, as long as it competeswith,
rather than buys, the incumbent monopoly provider for any subscribersover I ,.
the limit.
mCf.CentralHudsonGas&Elec.Corp.v. PublicSeroiceComm.ofNewYork,
447 U.S.557, 589(1980)(Rehnquist,C.J.,dissenling)(cit_tg similar concerns
with"fafl[ing] to give due deference to th[e] subordinate position of commer-
cial speech" as representSnga "return n to the bygone era of Lochner").
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